JKLR-Part(IV)                                                         LPAC 21/1994                              Back To Index

(2001) 1 J & K LAW REPORTER 389
High Court of Jammu and Kashmir
at Srinagar
Before
Hon’ble Dr. Justice B.P. Saraf, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.A. Kakru, Judge

PAWAN KUMAR                                                                                                          Appellant
                                                                               versus
NARINDER KUMAR JAIN                                                                                            Respondent

LPA (C) No. 21 /1994, decided on 14.02.2001.

            Letters Patent - Clause 12 - Appeal against judgment - Judgment - Meaning of - Whether order of impleadment amounts to judgment within the meaning of clause 12 - Held : No.

            Thus we hold that an order of  impleadment  does  not   amount to judgment within the meaning of clause 12 of  the Letters  Patent. However, we may hasten to add   that cases are conceivable  where  serious  injustice may   be caused to a party by allowing the application for impleadment.                                                                                                                    [Para 4]

Advocates who appeared in this case :
Mr. Rohit Kapoor, Advocate, for Appellant.
M/s. A.V. Gupta and Yaser Tak, Advocates, for Respondent.

Cases referred : Chronological
1. Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben Kania AIR 1981 SC 1786.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Per N. A. Kakru, Judge

            This  appeal  stems from the suit filed on the original side of this Court by the respondents 1  to 3 against one Shadilal and others, seeking partition  of   the  property  which forms subject-matter of the suit. During pendency of the suit, Shadilal defendant died    (deceased-defendant   hereinafter),   leaving behind  a  widow  namely  Mrs.  Sarla Jain, besides, two sons, namely, M/S Anand Jain and  Ashok   Jain. Being  legal  heirs  of the deceased defendant, they  sought their impleadment in the array of  defendants through  the   CMP  bearing No.288/90.  The CMP was allowed. All  the  three  applicants  came  to  be impleaded  as   defendants  by  order  of  the learned Single Judge dated 07.04.1994.This order is  called in  question  through this appeal under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. For facility of reference, clause 12 is extracted below:

 “12.    And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court  of Judicature  from  the  judgment  (not  being a judgment passed in the exercise  of  appellate jurisdiction  in  respect of a decree or order made  in  the  exercise    of   the   appellate jurisdiction   by    a  court  subject  to  the superintendence of the High Court, and not being  an   order  made  in  the  exercise    of revisional   jurisdiction   and  not  being  a sentence  or   order  passed  or  made  in  theexrcise  of  the  power of superintendence) of one Judge of the said High Court or one  Judge                                 of any Division court and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie  to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one  Judge of  any  Division Court, consistently with the provisisons of the Civil Procedure Code,  made in  the exercise of appeallate jurisdiction in respect of a  decree  or  order  made  in  the exercise   of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the  superintendence   of  the  said High  Court  where  the  Judge  who passed the judgment declares that the case is a  fit  onefor  appeal, but that the right of appeal fromother judgments of the Judges of the said High court or of such Division court  shall  be  to Us,  our   heirs  or Successors and be heard by our Board of Judicial Advisors for  report  to us.”

2.    A  plain  reading  of  clause 12 makes it manifestly clear that an appeal is competent from the decision of a Single  bench  provided  such  decision falls within  the  ambit  of  judgment.  Therefore, a moot question  arises  as  to  whether  an  order  of impleadment amounts to a judgment.  The contention of the  learned  counsel  for  the appellants is that it does.  He has placed reliance on Shah Babulal  Khimji v Jayaben   Kania  and another (AIR 1981 SC 1786).  In                          its para 120, illustrations of orders are given which may be treated as judgments but  these  illustrations do  not  include an order of impleadment of the legal heirs.  Thus it needs to  be   determined  whether  an order  of  impleadment  can be said to be a judgment. In this  behalf  it  is  appropriate  to  notice  the observations  of  the apex court in paras 106 and 119 of  the  judgment   supra,    which   are   reproduced hereunder:

“106.  Thus,  the  only  point  which  emerges from this decision is that whenever a trial   Judge  decides  a  controversy  which  affects  valuable  rights  of  one  of   the parties,   it must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.

119.  Apart from the tests laid  down by     Sir    White,   C.J.,    the   following considerations must prevail with the court:

(1)   That  the  trial  Judge being a senior court with vast experience  of various  branches  of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary  or  interlocutory orders  with  due  regard to the well settled principles of civil  justice. Thus,any    discretion exercised  or routine orders passed  by  the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may  cause   some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the  other  cannot  be  treated as a judgment  otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all   kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The  courts  must   give sufficient allowance to the  trial  Judge  and raise a presumption that any discretionary  order  which he passes must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice.

(2)   That the   interlocutory  order in order  to  be  a  judgment  must contain the traits and  trappings  of finality either   when   the  order decides the questions in  controversy in  an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself  or  in  a  part  of  the proceedings.”

3.     Analysing  the  aforementioned   guidelines,  it emerges that:

(a) an order which contains the traits and trappings of finality and                                          affects the rights of a party amounts to judgment  within  the  meaning  of                                         clause 12 of Letters Patent;

(b) a discretionary order has to be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice.

4.          The learned counsel  for  the  appellants  has vehemently contended that the legal heirs of Shadilal have   no  right  whatsoever  to claim the proprietary  rights  over  the  suit  property  because  same  was bequeathed    to   the   appellants   by  the  deceased defendant during his life time.To  appreciate  the contention it needs to be borne in mind that fall out of   the  order  impugned  in  essence facilitates the final adjudication of the controversy involved in the                          suit.  Whether property has been  bequeathed  to  the appellants is   an issue which is to be gone into.  If such stand is available  to  the  appellants  nothing prevents   them  to  press  it  into service, for, the impleadment  does  not  debar  them  to   urge such contention in  opposition  to  the claim.  The rights and liabilities of the parties with  respect  to  the suit  property   are  yet to be determined, obviously, the impleadment does not affect  the  merits  of  the controversy involved  in  the  suit.   As a matter of fact,  ample  opportunity is available to   the appellants  to  contest the claim of the legal heirs.  Thus we hold that an order of  impleadment  does  not   amount to judgment within the meaning of clause 12 of  the Letters  Patent. However, we may hasten to add   that cases are conceivable  where  serious  injustice may   cause to a party by allowing the application for impleadment.  Take the  instance  of  an  application which is  barred  by  limitation. By allowing such  application,   grave  and  substantial  injustice   is likely   to  cause to a party, therefore, unless delay  is  condonable  under  law  and   is    codoned,   the  application has   to  be rejected.  Sufficie it to say that admittedly the application in the case  in  hand was  not  barred  by limitation, therefore, the order impugned no way works injustice  to  the  appellants. Viewed   thus,  the  learned  Single  Judge  was quite justified to pass the order impugned.Same being sound in law, we are loath to display interference.

5.          Before parting with, it needs to  be  observed that  the   consequences are quite different where the application seeking impleadment  is  rejected. The rejection  deprives  a  party  of  the opportunity to advance and establish his claim.  It brings the claim to an end. It has the effect of finally deciding the controversy forming the subject-matter  of  the  suit itself, therefore, it is bound to constitute “judgment” within the meaning of clause 12 of Letters Patent.  Here it is advantageous to mention that  the apex  court  in  judgment  supra, while examining the orders to ascertain whether there is determination of right or liability, has held that an  order  refusing to   add  necessary parties in a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a   judgment  within the meaning of clause 12 of Letters Patent ( see para 120 sub-para   7  of the judgment aforementioned).  In our opinion the said illustration is analogous to  an order  rejecting  the  application  for  impleadment. Thus   the  view  taken  by  us  that   rejection    of                          application  seeking  impleadment amounts to judgment is substantially supported  by  the  judgment  supra. Accordingldy,  we  hold  that  the  Letters Patent is competent against rejection  of  the  application  of impleadment.

6.         In   the  result,  the  appeal  is  dismissed. However, in view of  peculiar  circumstances   of  thecase, no order as to costs.